Galaxy Digital’s latest assessment argues that quantum computing poses a credible future threat to Bitcoin, but not one that currently endangers the network as a whole. The firm’s central point is that the risk is highly uneven: exposure depends far more on wallet design and public-key visibility than on Bitcoin’s cryptography in the abstract.
That distinction is what keeps the issue from becoming an immediate systemic crisis. Galaxy separates the idea of a theoretical cryptographic break from the existence of a machine actually capable of carrying it out, and concludes that the hardware required to attack Bitcoin at scale remains far beyond what exists today.
quantum computing may threaten classical cryptography, including the crypto that powers bitcoin transactions
if there’s even a chance that’s true, the bitcoin community should work to prepare and mitigate
the good news is that bitcoin devs are indeed working on it pic.twitter.com/ZBf369mXOG
— Alex Thorn (@intangiblecoins) March 19, 2026
Exposure Depends on Which Wallets Have Already Revealed Their Keys
The report stresses that breaking Bitcoin’s secp256k1 elliptic-curve system would require a fault-tolerant quantum computer with roughly 2,330 qubits and around 129 billion logical gates. By Galaxy’s reading, that level of capability is still many years, and possibly decades, away from becoming practical.
That timeline, however, does not remove all present-day concern because some wallet structures have already exposed public keys on-chain. Galaxy notes that once a public key is visible, it can theoretically be harvested today and held for future exploitation under the “harvest now, decrypt later” model that regulators have also highlighted.
The most vulnerable category includes legacy Pay-to-Public-Key outputs and reused addresses, where public keys are already visible and permanently exposed. Project Eleven’s analysis, cited in the discussion, estimates that roughly 7 million BTC fall into this higher-risk class, although other estimates focus on narrower slices of legacy holdings that could still matter materially if compromised.
By contrast, modern address formats and better wallet hygiene reduce the danger because they keep public keys hidden until spending occurs. Single-use addresses and non-reuse practices significantly narrow the future attack window and make those holdings less exposed than older wallet patterns.
The Industry Has Time, but Not a Reason to Wait
Galaxy’s broader conclusion is that the ecosystem still has meaningful time to prepare, and that preparation is already underway. The firm points to proposals for post-quantum address types, phased migration paths that avoid unnecessary key exposure, and “hourglass” restrictions meant to limit spending from long-dormant addresses whose public keys are already public.
Standards development outside Bitcoin has also advanced enough to support that transition work. NIST finalized its first post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024, while Bitcoin developers have been discussing proposals such as BIP 360 and hybrid signature models that could bridge current cryptography with quantum-resistant schemes.
Galaxy’s practical message is that operators should treat this as an operational security issue, not as a reason for immediate market panic. Custodians, wallet providers and large holders should focus on key hygiene, address migration planning and custody procedures that minimize long-term public-key exposure.
In that sense, the firm’s warning is not that Bitcoin faces an imminent cryptographic collapse, but that high-exposure balances should not wait for quantum hardware to become a live threat before acting. The current gap between theory and machine capability gives the ecosystem room to prepare, but the effectiveness of that response will depend on how quickly wallet upgrades, standards adoption and migration strategies move from discussion into practice.
